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The 1987-1988 Term of the United States Supreme
Court ended in June. This is the first of two articles
reviewing the major decisions involving criminal procedure decided this Term.
SEARCH AND SEIZURE

Expectation of Privacy

~

California v. Greenwood, 108 S.Ct. 1625 (1988),
involved the search of a narcotic suspect's trash. After
receiving a tip and observing suspicious activity at
Greenwood's house, the police requested the regular
trash collector to pick up and turn over Greenwood's
garbage. A search revealed items indicative of narcotics
use. Based on this information, a warrant was issued,
and cocaine and hashish were discovered in Greenwood's house. The California courts suppressed the
evidence because the warrantless search of the trash
was not based on probable cause.
On review, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed. The
threshold question that must be asked when analyzing
search and seizure issues is whether the Fourth Amendment applies. If the Amendment is not applicable, neither
probable cause nor a search warrant is required. In a
series of cases the Court has held the Amendment
applicable only to certain governmental activities, that is,
those activities that intrude upon a citizen's justifiable
expectations of privacy. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347 (1967). Searches of homes, offices, cars, and
containers are covered by the Fourth Amendment, as is
electronic surveillance. In contrast, the police use of
informants, beepers, or pen registers is not protected by
the Amendment. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745
(1971); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983); Smith
v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). Similarly, searches of
jail cells, open fields, and bank records also fall outside
Fourth Amendment protection. Hudson v. Palmer, 468
U.S. 517 (1984); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170
(1984); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976). In all
these situations, the Court has found no justifiable
expectation of privacy.

In Greenwood the Court held that the inspection of
trash was not a "search" within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment. The warrantless search of trash left
on the curb would be protected by the Fourth Amendment only if the defendant manifested a subjective
expectation of privacy in his garbage that society accepted as objectively reasonable. According to the Court,
Greenwood's subjective expectations were not determinative because society was not prepared to accept
that expectation as reasonable.
Here, we conclude that respondents exposed their
garbage to the public sufficiently to defeat their claim
to Fourth Amendment protection. It is common knowledge that plastic garbage bags left on or at the Side of a
public street are readily accessible to animals, children,
scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public
... Moreover, respondents placed their refuse at the
curb for the express purpose of conveying it to a third
party, the trash collector, who might himself have sorted through respondent's trash or permitted others,
such as the police, to do so. Accordingly, having
deposited their garbage "in an area particularly suited
for public inspection and, in a manner of speaking,
public consumption, for the express purpose of having
strangers take it,"... respondents could have had no
reasonable expectation of privacy in the inculpatory
items that they discarded. 108 S.Ct. at 1628-29.

Stop and Frisk
Michigan v. Chesternut, 108 S.Ct. 1975 (1988), raised
the issue of whether an investigatory pursuit by the
police constituted a seizure of the person within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Four policemen in a
marked car were on a routine patrol when they observed
Chesternut and another man. As soon as Chesternut
saw the police, he began to run. The officers followed
and soon caught up to him. As they drove alongside of
Chesternut, he began to discard a number of packets.
One officer got out of the car and examined the packets,
finding pills which he believed contained cocaine.
Chesternut was arrested, taken to the station house, and
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searched. Additional drugs and a hypodermic needle
were"discovered;-Ghesternut moved to suppress the
evidence, and his motion was granted based on prior
state precedents, which had held that an investigatory
pursuit was a seizure under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968), and flight alone did not amount to reasonable
suspicion.
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed. Chesternut argued
that all police chases were seizures. In contrast, the
State argued that a seizure did not occur until the suspect stopped, and thus chases were never seizures. The
Court rejected both contentions, adopting instead a
middle ground. In Terry the Court wrote: "Obviously, not
all personal intercourse between policemen and citizens
involves 'seizures' of persons. Only when the officer, by
means of physicalforce or show of authority, has in some
way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude
that a 'seizure' has occurred." /d. at 19 n.16. Later the
Court adopted Justice Stewart's definition of a seizure.
Under this test, a person is seized "only if, in view of all of
the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to
leave." United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554
(1980).
Applying this test to the facts, the Court found no
seizure. The police did not activate a siren, command
Chesternut to stop, or display weapons. Neither did they
use tt\e car to block his path or control his direction or
speed. According to the Court, "[w]hile the very presence of a police car driving parallel to a running pedestrian could be somewhat intimidating, this kind of police
presence does not, standing alone, constitute a seizure."
108 S.Ct. at 1980. The brief acceleration to catch up with
C!:!esterllJ.Ilimc;IJheshort drive alongside were not so
intimidating that a reasonable person would believe they
could not go about their business. Thus, since there was
no seizure; there was no need to justify the pursuit with
reasonable suspicion.

does not mean that the facts thus obtained become
sacred and inaccessible. If knowledge of them is
gained from an independent source they may be
proved like any others. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v.
United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).
The rule was applied to Fifth and Sixth Amendment
violations (e.g., confessions and lineups) in later cases.
See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984); United States v.
Wade, 388 U.S. 218,240-42 (1967).1n a recent case, the
Court explained the rule as follows:
[T)he interest of society in deterring unlawful police
conduct and the public interest in having juries receive
all pro~Citi_v_e~ EIY_idEmce of a crime are properly balanced
by puttmgtfie:pollcein the same, not a worse, position
that they would have been in if no police error or misconduct had occurred ... When the challenged
evidence has an independent source, exclusion of
such evidence would put the police in a worse position
than they would have been in absent any error or violation. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443 (1984).
The Court believed that the independent source rule
may be applicable in Murray. According to the Court, the
ultimate question was "whether the search pursuant to
warrant was in fact a genuinely independent source of
the information and tangible evidence at issue here." 43
Crim. L. Rptr. at 3170-71. Therewouldbe no independent
source if the decision to seek the warrant was prompted
by what the police had seen during the illegal entry, or if
information obtained during that entry was used to establish the probable cause necessary for the warrant. The
Court remanded OR this issue, so that the District Court
could make further findings. In particular, whether "the
agents would have sought a warrant if they had not earlier entered the warehouse." /d.
CONFESSIONS
Miranda
The defendant in Arizona v. Roberson, 43 Crim. L.
Rptr. 3085 (1985), was arrested at the scene of a burglary.
Advised of his Miranda rights, he requested counsel.
Three days later, while still in custody, a different police
officer questioned him about a different burglary. This
officer was unaware of the fact that Roberson had
requested an attorney at the time of his arrest. Miranda
warnings were again read and an incriminating statement was obtained.
On review, the Supreme Court found a Miranda violation. The prosecution argued that Michigan v. Mosley,
423 U.S. 96 (1975), controlled. In Mosley the defendant
asserted his right to remain silent but did not request
counseL He was later questioned by a different police
officer about a different crime. This interrogation led to a
confession. The Court upheld the admissibility of the
confession, finding that the police had "scrupulously
honored" the defendant's decision to remain silent:
"[T]he police here immediately ceased the interrogation,
resumed questioning only after the passage of a significant period of time and the provision of a fresh set of
warnings, and restricted the second interrogation to a
crime that had not been the subject of the earlier interrogation." /d. at 105-06. The Court, however, had established a different rule when a suspect claims the right to

Independent Source
The defendants in Murray v. United States, 43 Crim. L.
Rptr. 3168 (1988), were placed under surveillance for
suspected drug violations. They were followed to a warehouse in South Boston. After they had left the warehouse,
the police entered without a warrant, viewing numerous
burlap-wrapped bales that were later found to contain
marijuana. The police left without disturbing the bales,
k13pt thewgreJwus~ under surveillance, and applied for a
search warrant. In applying for the warrant the police did
not mention their prior entry and did not rely on any
observations made during that entry. When the warrant
was issued, the police immediately reentered the warehouse and seized 270 bales of marijuana.
On review, the Supreme Court ruled that the search
could have been based on an untainted "independent
source." The independent source rule was first recognized by Justice Holmes soon after the exclusionary rule
was applied to federal prosecutions in Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). Justice Holmes wrote:
The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition
of evidence in a certain way is that not merely
evidence so acquired shall not be used before the
Court but that it shall not be used at all. Of course this
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counsel. In Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S 477 (1981), the
Court wrote:
[A]n accused ... having expressed his desire to deal
with the police only through counsel, is not subject to
further interrogation by the authorities until counsel
has been made available to him, unless the accused
himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or
conversations with the police. /d. at 484-85 (emphasis
added).
The Court ruled that the Edwards "initiation" rule
applied. In the Court's view, the fact that a different crime
was involved in the second interrogation did not matter.
The compulsion remained the same and was not dissipated by a second set of warnings, especially after prolonged police custody. Moreover, the factthat the second
officer was unaware of Robeson's initial request for counsel was irrelevant. That officer was obliged to determine
whether a demand for an attorney had been made: "The
police department's failure to honor that request cannot
be justified by the lack of diligence of a particular officer."
43 Grim. L. Rptr. at 3088.

admonished with the warnings prescribed by this
Court in Miranda . .. has been sufficiently apprised of
the nature of his Sixth Amendment rights, and of the
consequences of abandoning those rights, so that his
waiver on this basis will be considered a knowing and
intelligent one. We feel that our conclusion in .a recent
Fifth Amendment case is equally apposite here:
"Once it is determined that a suspect's decision not to
rely on his rights was uncoerced, that he at all times
knew he could stand mute and request a lawyer, and
that he was aware of the State's intention to use his
statement to secure a conviction, the analysis is complete and the waiver is valid as a matter of law." /d. at
3149 (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 422-23
(1986)).
Accordingly, the Court rejected the notion that a Sixth
Amendment waiver was "more demanding" than a Fifth
Amendment waiver, a position that had been advocated
by some commentators and adopted by a number of
courts.
RIGHT TO COUNSEL

Right to Counsel

Counsel of Choice

Patterson v. Illinois, 43 Grim. L. Rptr. 3146 (1988),
involved a confession and the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel. Patterson was arrested for his participation in a
gang fight, which he admitted after receiving Miranda
warnings. He was also suspected of a murder that occurred after the gang fight, but he denied any knowledge
of this incident. He was subsequently indicted for the
murder. While being transferred to a different jail, he
voluntarily made some incriminating statements. He was
promptly advised of his Miranda rights and confessed.
The Supreme Court ruled that Patterson's right to
counsel had not been violated. The Sixth Amendment
right to counsel differs from the Miranda rights, which are
based on the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination and also includes a right to counsel. The
Sixth Amendment is triggered by the commencement of
judicial adversary proceedings. Here, the indictment triggered Patterson's right to counsel. Patterson argued that
the indictment placed him in the same position as a preindictment suspect who, while being interrogated,
asserts the Fifth Amendment right to counsel. Under
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), such a suspect
may not be questioned again unless he initiates the
meeting with the police. The Court rejected this argument. The essence of Edwards is the preservation of
"the integrity of an accused's choice to communicate with
the police only through counsel." Because Patterson never
requested counsel, this policy was never implicated.
Patterson's second argument concerned the validity of
his decision to waive his right to counsel and speak to the
police. In particular, whether the Miranda warnings,
which are directed to Fifth Amendment rights, also
provide sufficient notice for the waiver of Sixth Amendment rights. The Court held that, in this context at least,
the warnings are sufficient. The Miranda warnings informed Patterson of his right to consult an attorney and
the consequences if he spoke without an attorney.
According to the Court, there was little else to tell him
about the right to counsel.
As a general matter, then, an accused who is

The defendant in Wheat v. United States, 108 S.Ct.
1692 (1988), along with numerous codefendants, was
charged with a far-flung drug distribution conspiracy. Two
of the codefendants, Gomez-Barajas and Bravo, were
represented by the same attorney, Eugene lredale. Bravo
pleaded guilty to one count of transporting marijuana,
and Gomez-Barajas offered to plead guilty to tax evasion
and illegal importation. At this point in the proceedings
lredale informed the trial court that Wheat wanted lredale
to represent him. The prosecution objected to the substitution of lredale as counsel on the ground that his
representation of Gomez-Barajas and Bravo created a
serious conflict of interest. There was a possibility that
Bravo would be called as a prosecution witness at
Wheat's trial, in which case lredale might not be able to
cross-examine him in a meaningful way. Despite this
conflict, Gomez-Barajas, Bravo, and Wheat were willing
to waive their right to conflict-free counsel. The trial
court, however, refused to permit the substitution. Wheat
went to trial with his original lawyer, was convicted, and
appealed.
The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the trial court's decision. The Court first pointed out the qualified nature of
the right to choose one's own counsel. For example, an
accused may not chose as an advocate a person who is
not a member of the bar. Similarly, an accused cannot
insist on an attorney that he cannot afford. Here, the
issue was the extent to which a criminal defendant's right
under the Sixth Amendment to his chosen attorney is
qualified by the fact that the attorney has represented
other defendants charged in the same conspiracy. In
prior cases the Court had held that multiple representation may raise a conflict of interest and thus violate the
right to effective assistance of counsel:
Joint representation of conflicting interests is suspect
because of what it tends to prevent the attorney from
doing ... [A) conflict may ... prevent an attorney from
challenging the admission of evidence prejudicial to
one client but perhaps favorable to another, or from
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arguing at the sentencing hearing the relative involvementandculpability of his clients in order to minimize
the culpability of one by emphasizing that of another.
Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 489-90 (1978).
A defendant's waiver of the right to conflict-free counsel
would not automatically cure the problem. The federal
courts have an independent interest in ensuring that
trials are conducted in conformance with ethical standards and just verdicts are rendered. Moreover, a trial
court must make its decision before all the evidence is
introduced at trial. This fact makes the decision more
difficult. In many cases even the attorneys will find it difficult to predict how the trial will develop; a "few bits of
unforeseen testimony or a single previously unknown or
unnoticed document may significantly shift the relationship between multiple defendants." /d. at 1699.
Accordingly, trial courts must be allowed "substantial
latitude in refusing waivers of conflicts of interest not only
in those rare cases where an actual conflict may be
demonstrated before trial, but in the more common
cases where a potential for conflict exists which may or
may not burgeon into an actual conflict as the trial
progresses." /d. In this case, the motion for substitution
was made two days before trial in a complex conspiracy
case with each defendant playing different roles. Under
these circumstances, the trial court's refusal to permit
substitution of counsel was not an abuse of discretion.

forward with the appeal. This is true whether counsel is
retained or appointed. Appointed counsel, however,
cannot withdraw without permission of the court. This
presents a dilemma, creating an apparent conflict between counsel's obligation to the court and his obligation
to his client. Anders attempted to resolve this dilemma.
An Anders brief "was designed to provide the appellate courts with a basis for determining whether appointed counsel have fully performed their duty to support
t~eir clients' appeals to the best of their ability." /d. at
1902. It also provides the court with a basis for determining whether counsel's judgment about the merits of an
appeal is correct. The Wisconsin "discussion" rule requires counsel to explain why the appeal lacks merit by,
for example, summarizing case or statutory authority
which support counsel's conclusions. As the Court
noted, the rule does go beyond Anders. "Instead of relying on an unexplained assumption that the attorney has
discovered law or facts that completely refute the arguments identified in the brief, the Wisconsin court requires
additional evidence of counsel's diligence." /d. at 1904.
According to the Court, this is consistent with Anders anc\
may in fact aid the client. The rule provides "an additional safeguard against mistaken conclusions by counsel
that the strongest arguments he or she can find are
frivolous." /d.
RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION

Appointed Counsel - Frivolous Appeals
McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, District 1, 108
S.Ct. 1895 (1988), concerned the scope of court-appointed appellate counsel's responsibility to an indigent client.
In Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), the Court
helattiatappellate counsel could not withdraw from an
appeal by simply advising the appellate court of his conclusion that the appeal was frivolous. Instead, counsel
must include with the request to withdraw "a brief
referring to anything in the records that might arguably
support the appeal." /d. at 744. The Wisconsin Supreme
Court adopted a rule that imposed an additional requirement in this context. The brief must also include "a discussion of why the issue lacks merit." McCoy, an
indigent, was convicted of abduction and sexual assault.
He challenged the "discussion" requirement as violative
of Anders and the Sixth Amendment.
On review, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the discussion rule. Initially, the Court reviewed
the difference between counsel's obligations at trial and
appeal. At trial, the defendant is presumed innocent. It is
proper for counsel to remain silent and require the prosecution to carry its burden of proof. Once convicted, however, the presumption of innocence no longer applies
and counsel must assert specific grounds for reversal.
This requirement carries with it ethical obligations.
Neither paid nor appointed counsel may deliberately
mislead the court with respect to either the facts or the
law, or consume the time and the energies of the court
or the opposing party by advancing frivolous arguments. An attorney, whether appointed or paid, is
therefore under an ethical obligation to refuse to
prosecute a frivolous appeal. 108 S.Ct. at 1900.
If counsel determines the appeal would be frivolous, he
must inform his client that it would be unethical to go

Face-to-face Accusation
The defendant in Coy v. Iowa, 56 Law Week 4931
(1988), was charged with sexually assaulting two 13-year
old girls. At trial the prosecution moved to have the girls
testify either via closed-circuit television or behind a
screen. Both procedures were authorized by statute. The
trial court opted to.use a large screen. Coy objected,
asserting his right of confrontation. The Iowa courts
rejected this claim.
When the issue reached the U.S. Supreme Court, it
reversed. The Court first reviewed its prior cases. In an
early case, Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47 (1899), the
Court had written: "[A] fact which can be primarily established only by witnesses cannot be proved against an
accused ... except by witnesses who confront him at
trial, upon whom he can look while being tried ..."/d. at
55. Similarly, in a recent case, the Court observed: "The
Confrontation Clause provides two types of protections
for a criminal defendant: the right physically to face those
who testify against him, and the right to conduct crossexamination." Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 51
(1987).
Next, the Court found that face-to-face confrontation
was essential to fairness and the integrity of the factfinding process. "It is always more difficult to tell a lie
about a person 'to his face' than 'behind his back.' In the
former context, even if the lie is told, it will often be told
less convincingly." 56 Law Week at 4933. In the Court's
view, the importance of this right outweighed its drawbacks.
[F]ace-to-face presence may, unfortunately, upset the
truthful rape victim or abused child; but by the same
token it may cor.found and undo the false accuser, or
reveal the child coached by a malevolent adult. It is a
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truism that constitutional protections have costs. /d.
The Court aeclined to determine whether an exception
to face-to-face confrontation could be justified. The State
argued that the statute created a presumption of trauma
for child abuse victims. The record in this case, however,
did not support such a finding. "Since there have been
no individualized findings that these particular witnesses
needed special protection, the judgment here could not
be sustained by any conceivable exception." /d. at 4934.
The Court then sent the case back to the state courts to
consider the harmless error rule.
Justice O'Connor, who joined the majority opinion,
also wrote a concurring opinion, in which Justice White
joined. Their votes were necessary for a majority. She
wrote:
I agree with the Court that appellant's rights under the
Confrontation Clause were violated in this case. I write
separately only to note my view that those rights are
not absolute but rather may give way in an appropriate
case to other competing interests so as to permit the
use of certain procedural devices designed to shield a
child witness from the trauma of courtroom testimony./d.
She specifically referred to state statutes that authorized
closed circuit television and video-taped testimony. Thus,
"if a court makes a case-specific finding of necessity,"
the compelling state interest of protecting the child could
outweigh the defendant's right.

identification of respondent was the result of the
suggestions of people who visited him in the hospital.
/d. at 843.
The Court also considered a hearsay objection. Federal Evidence Rule 801(d}(1}(C) excludes from the hearsay
rule a prior statement "of identification of a person made
after perceiving the person," if the declarant "testifies at
trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination
concerning the statement." The Court ruled that the
requirements of this provision had been satisfied; the
witness had been subjected to cross-examination
"concerning the statement." He was placed on the stand,
took the oath, and responded willingly to questions. His
loss of memory did not preclude cross-examination on
the statement.
Just as with the constitutional prohibition, limitations
on the scope of examination ... may undermine the
process to such a degree that meaningful crossexamination within the intent of the rule no longer
exists. But that effect is not produced by the witness's
assertion of memory loss- which, as discussed earlier, is often the very result sought to be produced by
cross-examination, and can be effective in destroying
the force of the prior statement. Rule 801(d)(1)(C),
which specifies that the cross-examination need only
"concer[n] the statement," does not on its face require
more. /d. at 844.
(Ohio Evidence Rule 801(D)(1)(c} is identical to the federal rule except for the addition of one word).

Hearsay
United States v. Owens, 108 S.Ct. 838 (1988), involved
a confrontation-hearsay issue. John Foster, a correctional
counselor, was assaulted in a federal prison. He suffered
a fractured skull, which resulted in an impaired memory.
While hospitalized, he identified Owens as his attacker
and picked his picture from an array of photographs. At
trial, Foster testified about the attack, including his identification of Owens while in the hospital. On cross-examination, however, he admitted that he could not remember
seeing his assailant. Foster also admitted that he could
not remember any of the numerous visitors who he saw
in the hospital, except tor the F.B.I. agent who interviewed
him. He could not remember whether any of these visitors suggested Owens as the attacker. The defense
attempted to refresh his recollection with hospital
records, including one in which he attributed the assault
to a third party. Owens was convicted and appealed on
hearsay and confrontation grounds.
The Supreme Court rejected both arguments. The
Court concluded that the Confrontation Clause did not
bar testimony concerning a prior out-of-court identification when the identifying witness is unable, because of
memory loss, to explain the basis for the identification.
According to the Court, the Clause guarantees only an
opportunity for effective cross-examination. This right is
satisfied when the defendant has the opportunity to bring
out such matters as a bad memory.
The weapons available to impugn the witness's statement when memory loss is asserted will of course not
always achieve success, but successful cross-examination is not the constitutional guarantee. They are,
however, realistic weapons, as demonstrated by
defense counsel's summation in this very case, which
emphasized Foster's memory loss and argued that his

FIFTH AMENDMENT

Comment Upon Failure to Testify
The defendant in United States v. Robinson, 108 S.Ct.
864 (1988}, was convicted of mail fraud. The prosecution
introduced a number of out-of-court statements made to
the police by Robinson, who did not testify. In closing
argument Robinson's counsel tried to minimize the prior
statements by suggesting that his client had not been
given the opportunity to explain his actions. In response,
the prosecutor told the jury: "He could have taken the
stand and explained it to you ..."
The Sixth Circuit ruled that this comment violated the
Fifth Amendment, citing Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609
(1965). In Griffin the Court wrote:
·
[Comment on the refusal to testi!y) is a penalty
imposed by courts for exercising a constitutional privilege. It cuts down on the privilege by making its assertion costly. It is said, however, that the inference of guilt
for failure to testify as to facts peculiarly within the
accused's knowledge is in any event natural and
irresistible, and that comment on the failure does not
magnify that inference into a penalty for asserting a
constitutional privilege. What the jury may infer, given
no help from the court, is one thing. What it may infer
when the court solemnizes the silence of the accused
into evidence against him is quite another. /d. at 614.
Accordingly, the Court held that the Fifth Amendment
"forbids either comment by the prosecution on the
accused's silence or instructions by the court that such
silence is evidence of guilt." /d. at 615.
The Court in Robinson, however, distinguished Griffin.
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It is one thing to use the Fifth Amendment as a shield; it
is ~l:!itl3canother thing to use it as a sword: Where the prosecutor on his own initiative asks the
jury to draw an adverse inference from a defendant's
silence, Griffin holds that the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination is violated. But where as in this
case the prosecutor's reference to the defendant's
opportunity to testify is a fair response to a claim made
by defendant or his counsel, we think there is no violation of the privilege. /d. at 869.

compelled production of business records violated the
Fifth-Amendment. The Court upheld the claim, accepting
the lower court's finding that by producing the records,
Doe would admit that the records existed, were in his
possession, and were authentic. Baswell argued that as
sole shareholder he was in the same position and that
Doe controlled.
A second line of cases, however, thwarted his claim.
These cases recognized the "collective entity rule." In an
early case, Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906), the Court
had held that a corporation was not protected by the Fifth
Amendment. Subsequently, the Court held that the
custodian of corporate records could not assert the privilege iilresp-or'fsEHOasi.ibpoena, even if those records
incriminated him. Dreier v. United States, 221 U.S. 394
(1911); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911). The
rationale of these cases was extended to labor unions in
United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944), and to a
small partnership in Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85
(1974). In effect, a person who holds the records of a
collective entity in a representative capacity cannot
assert his own privilege to preclude production. The
Court held that this line of authority controlled: "A custodian may not resist a subpoena for corporate records on
Fifth Amendment grounds." 43 Crim. L. Rptr. at 3106.
Underlying the. Court's decision was a concern for
white-collar crime prosecutions:
[R]ecognizing a Fifth Amendment privilege on behalf
of the records custodians of collective entities would
have a detrimental impact on the Government's efforts
to prosecute "white-collar crime," one of the most serious problems confronting law enforcement authorities.
"The greater portion of evidence of wrongdoing by an
organization or its representative is usually found in
the official records and documents of that organization ..Were tbecJoakofthe privilege to be thrown
around these impersonal records and documents,
effective enforcement of many federal and state laws
would be impossible:' /d. at 3107 (quoting United
States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 700 (1944)).

Corporate Records
Braswell v. United States, 43 Crim. L. Rptr. 3103 (1988),
involved the Fifth Amendment in the corporate context.
Braswell controlled two corporations. State law required
three directors. His wife and mother were the other directors but did not exercise any authority over the business
affairs of the corporations. In August 1986 a federal
grand jury issued a subpoena to Braswell, in his capacity
as president, for the books and records of both corporations. Baswell moved to quash the subpoena, arguing
that the actofproducing the records would incriminate
him in violation of the Fifth Amendment.
On review, the Supreme Court rejected this argument,
and thereby resolved an issue that had divided the lower
courts. Baswell's situation fell between two lines of
cases. One line of cases had recognized that the act of
producing documents in response to a subpoena may
trigger Fifth Amendment protection:
The act of producing evidence in response to a
subpoena nevertheless has communicative aspects of
its own, wholly aside from the contents of the papers
produced. Compliance with the subpoena tacitly
.. conced.esJhe existence of the papers demanded and
their possession or control by the taxpayer. It also
would indicatethe taxpayer's belief that the papers are
those described in the subpoena. Fisher v. United
States, 425 U.S. 391, 410 (1976).
Later, in United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984), the
Court considered a claim by a sole proprietor that the
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